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Resilience of the Communist Party of  
Vietnam’s Authoritarian Regime since  
i Mi  
Hai Hong Nguyen  
Abstract: Unlike communist parties in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern and Central Europe, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
has overcome crises to remain in power for the last 30 years and will 
most likely continue ruling in the coming decades. Strategies and tactics 
undertaken by the CPV are found to be identical to those canvassed in 
the extant literature on the durability of authoritarian regimes around the 
world. The present paper argues that the CPV’s regime has been resilient 
thus far because it has successfully restored and maintained public trust, 
effectively constrained its opposition at home, and cleverly reduced ex-
ternal pressures. To support this argument, the analysis electively focuses 
on four aspects: (1) economic performance, (2) political flexibility, (3) 
repression of the opposition, and (4) expansion of international relations.  
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Introduction 
Political crises between the late 1970s and the early 1990s transformed 
dozens of authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships into democra-
cies across the world, generating the so-called ‘Third Wave of Democra-
tization’ (Huntington 1991). This ‘wave’ contributed to the number of 
democratic countries increasing from 44 in 1973 to 86 in 2000–2001 (FH 
2010). In 2011, the ‘Arab Spring’ ended dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya, inspiring other popular uprisings in the Arab world, from 
Yemen and Bahrain to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and forthrightly 
cultivated in a high expectation for another possible wave – the ‘fourth 
wave’ – of democratisation (Diamond 2011; Gershman 2011; Howard 
and Hussain 2013). These events show us that democracy can take root 
and grow in every corner of the world, including in non-secular societies 
in the Arab world that had been branded as “exceptionalism” to democ-
racy (Harik 2006; Diamond 2010), and further intensifies the conven-
tional wisdom that authoritarian regimes and dictatorships are inherently 
fragile (Nathan 2003).  
Nevertheless, more than two decades after Fukuyama declared the 
“end of history” (1989), marked by the predominance of liberalism asso-
ciated with free-market capitalism and political democracy, and while the 
expansion of global democracy has assuredly been an impressive devel-
opment, authoritarianism has persisted in numerous states and re-
emerged in one form or another in many post-transitional states. Be-
tween 1972 and 2003, 77 per cent of transitions from authoritarian gov-
ernment resulted in another authoritarian regime, but only 23 per cent of 
such transitions led to democracy (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 152). 
These findings are further supported by the discovery that of 123 demo-
cratic transformations took place between 1960s and 2004, only 67 dem-
ocratic regimes survived through 2004, while 56 ended up returning to 
authoritarianism by the end of that year (Kapstein and Converse 2008: 
59). According to the Freedom House, prior to the ‘Arab Spring’, 89 of 
the world’s 194 countries were “free”, 58 were “partly free” and 47 were 
“not free” (FH 2010). These figures do not offer much grounds for 
optimism among democracy supporters. As Thomas Carothers has not-
ed, it is no longer appropriate to assume that the world is moving away 
from dictatorial rule and in transition toward democracy (2002). 
Since the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, democracy seems 
to have been in decline further and authoritarianism has been resurgent 
globally (Diamond 2015; Kornai 2015; Levitsky and Way 2015; 
Shevtsova 2015; Walker 2015). Countries involved in the Arab Spring are 
noticeable examples of how the hopes for a fourth wave of democratisa-
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tion have been doused. Five years on, real democracy has not yet been 
delivered in these countries, with the exception of Tunisia (Butt 2014). 
In Egypt, for instance, the government has returned to old authoritarian 
practices with increased military involvement in governance and political 
affairs (FH 2015). Saudi Arabia remains one of the worst human rights 
abusers in the world (FH 2016). Democracy supporters are more rigor-
ously depressed by the fact that many well-established and newer democ-
racies have been performing poorly in economic terms (Fukuyama 2015) 
and political rights and civil liberties have worsened significantly across 
the globe (FH 2014, 2015). Authoritarian regimes have smartly adopted 
reactive and proactive strategies, including the use of the Internet, which 
was heralded as a “tool of liberation” five years ago at the heyday of the 
Arab Spring to fight on-line anti-government movements, scrutinise 
democracy activists and extend their reach and authority (Kalathil and 
Boas 2001, 2003). The fact authoritarian regimes are not only proving 
their resilience and capacity for resurgence but also are actively shaping 
the cyberspace to their own strategic advantage has become conventional 
wisdom (Deibert 2015: 64). Given this fact, there is an inevitable need to 
explore why certain authoritarian regimes bucked global trends and 
maintained their grip on power at the end of the 20th century, and yet 
still survived in the second decade of the 21st century and possibly for 
many more years to come. 
The durability of authoritarian regimes in Vietnam and China shows 
that there needs a rethink of the conventional wisdom on the fragility of 
these regimes. In Vietnam, the rise and resilience of the regime is closely 
associated with the rule of the Marxist–Leninist communist party. 
Founded in 1930 in the British-colonised China-Hong Kong, the Com-
munist Party of Vietnam (CPV) became the ruling party in the northern 
part of Vietnam after defeating the French at in Biên Ph in 1954, 
and across the nation since 1976 following the collapse of the American-
backed southern regime.1  The next decade saw the CPV’s rationalist 
installation of a Stalinist-style centrally planned economy. This led to a 
profound and comprehensive social crisis by the mid-1980s, generating a 
serious decline in public trust and a pendulum in socialism among party 
members, inviting a real threat to the CPV’s legitimacy and survival 
(CPV 1991; Vasavakul 1995; Luong 2003; CPV 2005; Kerkvliet 2005; 
London 2009; Thayer 2010). The CPV responded to the crisis by formal-
                                                 
1  Vietnam was militarily reunified in 1975 after communist troops entered Sài 
Gòn, the former name for what is now called Ho Chi Minh City, and the 
American-backed southern regime declared surrender on 30 April of that year. 
  34 Hai Hong Nguyen 
 
ly introducing an all-embracing policy known as i Mi (or renewal)2 at 
its 6th National Congress in late 1986, shifting away from the command 
economy and reaching extensively to the outside world. Progress 
achieved in all fields resulting from i Mi in the last three decades is 
indisputable. Economically, Vietnam has impressively joined the rank of 
lower middle-income nations. High economic growth that continued 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s led to Vietnam being dubbed as an 
‘economic dragon’, similar to South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan in the 1970s. In the political sphere, Vietnamese society is be-
coming increasingly pluralistic (London 2013; H
i 2016b). Vietnam has 
expanded its relations with most countries, including its former enemies 
France and the United States, and proactively involved in international 
institutions (Thayer 2015). i Mi’s achievements have obviously ena-
bled the ruling CPV to not only restore public trust but to also continue 
intensifying its legitimacy and monopoly of power.  
This article looks at Vietnam as a typical case study of the resilience 
of an authoritarian regime. I start by reviewing the extant literature on 
the resilience of authoritarian regimes. In the second section, I electively 
analyse measures undertaken by the ruling CPV since i Mi. The 
analysis shows that the CPV’s measures are adaptive to both endogenous 
and exogenous pressures and have three main aims. First, to regain and 
maintain public trust by carrying out both economic and political re-
forms. Second, to constrain internal pressure by preventing the opposi-
tion from its nascence. Third to reduce external pressure by increasing 
linkages to the West to reinforce the CPV’s legitimacy and its regime. 
Finally, the article offers some thoughts on challenges to the CPV’s rule 
in the future. 
Extant Literature  
During times of crisis, the resilience of regimes is manifest in their ability 
to anticipate and prepare for shocks, to effectively undertake measures to 
respond to crises as they unfold. Regimes that are able to survive these 
crises have their political legitimacy intensified as a result. In recent dec-
ades, scholars have identified a number of sources to the resilience of 
authoritarian regimes (for different types of authoritarian regimes and 
hybrid regimes, see some sampling: Collier and Levitsky 1997; Geddes 
1999; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Ottaway 2003; 
                                                 
2  See our discussion of the concept ‘i Mi’ in H
i Hng Nguyn and Phm 
Quang Minh (2016, forthcoming). 
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Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). These sources can 
be divided into two categories: the national elements, which are identi-
fied by the domestic structuralist approach, and the international diffu-
sion effects on national politics, which have been inspired by the massive 
increase in the number of democracies since the end of the Cold War 
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 37).  
To keep grip on power, authoritarian rulers first and foremost rely 
on a well-trained, equipped and effective loyal internal security apparatus 
(Skocpol 1979; Bellin 2004; Way 2008). The core of this apparatus lies in 
security forces that are vested with dual-mandated duties to cope effec-
tively with mass protests, and where necessary to intimidate and even use 
violence to restore public order. In addition to overly repressive actions 
such as dispersing organised protests or harassing and arresting opposi-
tionists, this apparatus may also undertake “low-intensity” actions such 
as denying licenses or basic social services, extending special taxes, and 
ordering attacks by non-uniformed thugs (Levitsky and Way 2010). By 
doing that, the authoritarian rulers aim to convince aspiring opposition-
ists that organising resistance is personally risky and also unlikely to ac-
complish any desired goals. 
In addition to the security apparatus, high economic performance 
and control over natural resources are important for authoritarian re-
gimes to maintain long-term popular support and to be resilient to peri-
ods of crisis (Huntington 1991). The regimes usually manage to hold 
power through violent revolutions and earn their political legitimacy not 
in free elections but by public belief in assumed values. Hence, for them 
to stay in power, authoritarian rulers must dutifully deliver high-level 
economic growth and improve the living standards of most citizens. 
Some scholars have contended that those authoritarian rulers who 
achieve higher per capita incomes and avoid acute short-term economic 
downfalls tend to hold onto power for longer periods (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997; Geddes 1999). Nevertheless, modernisation theory in-
forms us that the link between economic performance and regime sur-
vival is not always lineal. Citizens’ expectations are proportionate with 
their increase in living standards. Consequently, if their expectations are 
left unfulfilled, the regime will lose public support (Gurr 1968). Moreo-
ver, modernisation theorists like Lipset (1959) and Rostow (1960) argued 
that continued economic growth can transform society in destabilising 
ways, unleashing new social forces that cannot be managed through 
established forms of political control. For authoritarian regimes that 
possess rich resource, as is the case with some Arab countries, this prob-
lem is less acute. This is because the regime can generate massive wealth 
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by tapping oil or gas reserves, and can thus distribute economic re-
sources to its supporters, creating a middle class that is dependent upon 
the regime for its material well-being (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Walle 
1998; Way 2008). For resource-poor authoritarian regimes, economic 
growth is a double-edged sword. While they justify their rule through 
economic achievement, they must also avoid short-term economic 
downturns and find new methods to control increasingly dynamic, com-
plex societies. 
The durability of authoritarian regimes is also determined by wheth-
er formal institutions like political parties are in place and how effectively 
they function. Empirical studies have shown that having a powerful and 
highly institutionalised political party really matters for the durability of 
these regimes (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). It has 
been argued that a hegemonic party stands as the sole vehicle for access-
ing state rents, political positions, and the privileges associated with loy-
alty to the ruling regime (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008). Furthermore, 
beyond the distribution of patronage, the party may also bind cadres 
together by legitimising an official ideology and the shared experience of 
armed struggle, especially in the case of revolutionary authoritarian re-
gimes (Way 2008; Levitsky and Way 2013). Most importantly, a party can 
establish universally applicable and merit-based procedures for how 
cadres are promoted and dismissed. From the vantage point of officials, 
this provides a more credible commitment that one’s continued loyalty 
to the party will translate into personal and professional benefits in the 
long term (Nathan 2003; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008). However, 
during times of unrest, the party may reduce the benefits that cadres 
might receive for defecting to the opposition. Hence, benefit cuts could 
pose a threat to the coherence and power of the party. Powerful political 
parties can also consolidate their power by shrewdly managing leadership 
turnovers. Such parties tend to establish norms and procedures for suc-
cession (Bratton and Walle 1997; Geddes 1999; Nathan 2003; Hale 2005). 
This ‘intra-democracy’ approach helps mitigate disagreement within the 
party and among the elite, reducing the risk of a break in the party’s unity. 
As a result, the ruling elite will be less likely to fragment in the face of 
public opposition or reveal visible divisions that might be exploited by 
outsiders. 
Elections, an indicator of democracy, are also conducive to the du-
rability of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Alt-
hough questions have been raised about their actual meaning 
(Morgenbesser 2014) because they are usually seen as ‘window dressing’ 
(Gandhi 2008), elections in authoritarian regimes are held to connect the 
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elites with the public. Moreover, the regime-sustaining function of these 
institutions is so pivotal that the holding of formal elections presents no 
clear division between authoritarianism and democracy. These nominally 
competitive elections in no way represent democracy, but in the long 
term they can serve democratising purposes (Diamond 2002; Levitsky 
and Way 2002; Schedler 2002). In competitive authoritarian regimes, 
which are also branded as hybrid regimes combining characteristics of 
democracy and authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010: 5), formal 
elections are held but manipulated by authoritarian rulers to varying 
degrees in order to maintain, if not enhance, their grip on power. In fact, 
authoritarian regimes use elections to consolidate and increase their legit-
imacy (Schmitter 1978), divide and weaken the opposition (Linz 1978), 
identify critics of the regime, provide forums for forging compromises 
with potential challengers (Gandhi 2008; Lust 2009), reduce official cor-
ruption and malfeasance (Nathan 2003), increase government respon-
siveness (Manion 1996), and give dictators the opportunity to make a 
non-violent exit from power (Schedler 2009). In effect, authoritarian 
regimes that hold nominally democratic elections have substantially 
greater longevity than those that do not (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). 
A durable authoritarian regime is one that is able to withstand ex-
ternal pressures for transformation. That said, the durability of authori-
tarian regimes cannot be attributed solely to domestic factors, and also 
must be understood within a particular international context. In recent 
decades, scholars of regime transitions have stopped their tendency to 
treat the breakdown of authoritarianism and the appearance of democra-
cy as primarily domestic processes. Empirical studies have found that 
political transitions away from authoritarianism cluster both spatially and 
temporally (Huntington 1991; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Kopstein and 
Reilly 2003; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). In 
addition, a country’s proximity to democratic neighbours is a stronger 
predictor of its potential for democratisation than any particular social 
requisites (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006). It has 
been suggested that the establishment of democracy in one country also 
has a powerful demonstration effect on its neighbours. This reveals the 
possibility of democratisation in the first country, inspires the morale of 
the opposition and exposes the kinds of mobilisation tactics that dissi-
dents might use to challenge and overthrow a regime (Huntington 1991). 
The ‘graduates’ of opposition movements in their own countries could 
help to bring about electoral revolutions in neighbouring authoritarian 
regimes (Bunce and Wolchik 2006). However, that diffusion dynamics 
may not necessarily explain regime breakdown, as was the case in Arme-
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nia in 2003 and 2008, Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2005, and Belarus in 2006, 
where electoral challenges proved to be ineffective (Way 2008). Fur-
thermore, the demonstration effect of successful revolutions in other 
states does not always work in favour of opposition activists as authori-
tarian rulers also learn from successful and failed electoral revolutions 
abroad to strengthen their regime in the present (Way 2005; Carothers 
2006). 
There are other tools that authoritarian regimes employ to enhance 
their durability. These include power-sharing, by which the rulers aim to 
control threats from different groups in society to rebel (Magaloni 2008); 
elite cohesion, which purports to prevent possible defection within the 
party (Levitsky and Way 2012); and cohesive mass organisations, which 
are created and manipulated by the rulers to manage and survive crises 
(Levitsky and Way 2012). However, not all of these tools are applicable 
to every authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime in Vietnam has 
been resilient thus far because it has electively undertaken measures that 
can be seen as being identical to the sources canvassed above. 
CPV’s Resilient Authoritarianism since i Mi 
Since its establishment in 1930 until the end of the anti-American war in 
1975, the CPV’s political legitimacy and authoritarian regime were built 
on the three grounds – traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic – as 
identified in Max Webber’s well-known theory on how regimes seek to 
legitimate themselves (see Roth and Wittich 1978; White 1986; Dogan 
2001). In the post-war era, the CPV has relied on its ability to confront 
and manage crises. In the mid-1980s, Vietnam found itself in an all-sided 
social crisis that had seriously eroded public trust and threatened the 
CPV’s legitimacy (CPV 1991; Vasavakul 1995; Luong 2003b; CPV 2005; 
Kerkvliet 2005; London 2009; Thayer 2010). The party at that time con-
fronted a critical question: reform or death? In late 1986, the CPV for-
mally introduced a policy, known as i Mi, that involved shifting away 
from state-socialist economic institutions, the base of the command 
economy that was partly attributable for causing the crisis, and conduct-
ing selective political reforms that were arguably for democratising pur-
poses (H
i and Minh 2016). In 1996, the CPV articulated that the coun-
try had surmounted the comprehensive crisis; public trust was restored 
and political regime was firmly maintained (CPV 1996). As of early 2016, 
Vietnam had joined the ranks of lower middle-income states and had 
established diplomatic relations with most countries, including its former 
war foes. The analysis that follows concentrates on the measures the 
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CPV has undertaken in the last three decades, including its repressive 
tactics to cope with a new challenge that emerges as a by-product of i 
Mi – the increasingly independent civic voices that criticise the CPV’s 
continued Marxist-Leninist political institutions and call for substantial 
political reforms towards democracy (Thayer 1992, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; 
Kerkvliet 2015). 
Economic Performance  
Prior to i Mi, the CPV-installed state-socialist economic institutions 
failed to meet the basic needs for survival of its citizens, who had been 
devastated by decades of armed confrontation. Meanwhile, corruption in 
the elite was widespread, in contrast to the citizens’ impoverishment. 
Civic protests in rural and urban areas, starting in the mid-1980s, mani-
fested the decay of regime performance (for a sampling, see Kolko 1997; 
Vasavakul 1998; Thayer 2009a), which threatened the CPV’s legitimacy. 
Empirical studies have shown that regime performance over time is 
an important factor that contributes to building and maintaining broad-
based system support. Political regimes are resilient in the long run if 
there is a deep popular belief in the effectiveness and legitimacy of their 
institutions. More particularly, sound and effective economic policies in 
terms of delivering what citizens want and expect from their government 
are an important dimension of regime performance, efficacy and legiti-
mation.  
As early as the 1990s, Vietnam was considered an under-developed 
country and its populace was in chronic poverty and hunger. Neverthe-
less, within a decade, i Mi had yielded impressive economic results. 
The average economic growth rate in the period from 1991–1995 was 
8.2 per cent, and in the 10 years from 1988 to 1997 it was 7.1 per cent. 
The inflation rate decreased from 67.1 per cent in 1991 to 12.7 per cent 
in 1995 and 5 per cent in 1996. The most impressive indicator for the 
success of i Mi on a larger scale is Vietnam’s decline in poverty rate, 
which was even more steep than that of China. The poverty rate fell 
from 75 per cent in 1984 to 34.7 per cent in 1997, then to 15 per cent in 
2007 and 5.8 per cent in 2014. Before the Asian financial crisis in 1998, 
Vietnam had been dubbed as an emerging economic ‘dragon’ in East 
Asia (CPV 1996; Dollar and Litvack 1998; Glewwe, Gragnolati, and 
Zaman 2000; Abuza 2001; Adams 2002). Although Vietnam still has 
social inequality, which is actually increasing, most Vietnamese have 
experienced significant improvements in their standard of living. This is 
reflected across a wide range of socio-economic indicators, from house-
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hold income to life expectancy. Economic growth has also permitted 
broader access to essential goods and services such as education and 
health, clean water and electricity. It is no exaggeration to state that i 
Mi has transformed the former CPV Secretary-General Lê Dun’s vi-
sion in 1976 of a radio, a television set and a fridge for each family with-
in 10 years into a truism. Significantly, economic progress is a critical 
factor that helps maintain social order and political stability, given that 
approximately 80 per cent of the Vietnamese population live in rural 
areas.  
In the post- i Mi era, civic protests and demonstrations have 
not been unusual in Vietnamese politics. Somewhat surprisingly, howev-
er, none of these protests is linked with economic downturn, as is the 
case in many other countries. This does not necessarily imply that the 
country has a good governance system, but the regime could have been 
able to avoid another social crisis when it was hit by the global financial 
crisis in 2008 by ensuring that its economy has continued to grow by 4–6 
per cent annually in the past seven years. While the world potentially 
faces a new cycle of economic turbulence, Vietnam’s economy grew at 
6.68 per cent in 2015 and is expected to increase by 6.5 per cent in 2016 
– rates that most countries would envy. The CPV may confront critiques 
of its constraint on political liberalisation, but undeniably high economic 
performance has enabled the CPV to intensify its legitimacy since i 
Mi given that its traditional grounds of legitimacy is fading (Hip 2012). 
Political Flexibility  
The term “political flexibility” (uyn chuyn v chính tr), as used in this 
context, partly overlaps with the concept “responsive state” that Kerk-
vilet used in reference to the CPV’s response to public demands 
(Kerkvliet 2010). More broadly, the term allows an all-embracing inter-
pretation of the CPV’s political actions, including political reforms such 
as a change of electoral rules that aim to promote democracy within the 
CPV’s power structure, or a reform in working methods of the national 
assembly to hold the government more accountable. In a nutshell, it can 
be a dutiful response of the authorities to public demands in “everyday 
politics” (Kerkvliet 2005). Furthermore, “political flexibility” in this 
context concurs with the argument that political reforms should have 
been considered on the one hand as “sincerity” (thành tâm) on the part of 
the CPV to catch up with the spin-offs of economic liberalisation, and, 
on the other hand, as tactics to minimise public outrage that potentially 
challenges the party-state’s authority (H
i 2016a). These political move-
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ments should be seen in a constructive manner as progressive democrati-
sation in the nation since i Mi (H
i and Minh 2016).  
Political reforms conducted by the CPV in the last three decades 
have been responsive to public demands and have absorbed public out-
rage in mechanisms under the party’s control (H
i 2016a, 2016b), as well 
as the endogenous needs within the party itself. From organisational 
perspectives, they have strengthened the CPV’s ability to cope with new 
challenges and intensify its “combat-ability” (sc chin u). The most 
notable political reform is the CPV’s adoption of grassroots democracy 
in 1998 in response to peasant protests in Thái Bình in 1997. Initially 
undertaken as a political experiment (Abuza 2001a: 87), the implementa-
tion of the norm has now been made compulsory nationwide. Although 
grassroots democracy has been described as “window-dressing,” imply-
ing that it just showcases the CPV’s rhetoric on democracy, there are 
success stories in which local people have been able to implement some 
political rights. The failure and success of grassroots democracy show 
the dynamics in implementing this norm in a political environment 
where the law is subject to the party’s rules. However, what needs to be 
emphasised here is that grassroots democracy provides a mutually em-
powering mechanism for the party and the peasants. Grassroots democ-
racy is a mechanism that enables the CPV to stabilise rural areas and 
mitigate peasant dissatisfaction (H
i 2016a: 41). 
Organisational adaptation to market conditions is a showcase of the 
CPV’s political flexibility in the reform era, even though the idea of en-
trepreneurship contradicts with communist ideologies. In 2006, the 10th 
Party Congress adopted a resolution allowing party members to run 
businesses. This decision was followed by another breakthrough com-
mitment at the 11th Party Congress in 2011, when the CPV agreed to 
admit private entrepreneurs into the party. Many saw this change as a 
break away from party rules and Marxist–Leninist ideology. Private en-
trepreneurs, the “enemy of socialism” (Han and Baumgarte 2000: 6), can 
now join the party, despite fears among conservatives that this reform 
will threaten the party’s class representation and nature (Thông 2011). In 
effect, this new party resolution aims to formalise a de facto practice that 
has been implemented since the early 1990s. In March 1994, under Deci-
sions 90/TTg and 91/TTg issued by the prime minister, a large number 
of state-owned enterprises were merged into large-scale state corpora-
tions or economic groups known as Corporations 90 or 91, nearly half of 
whose operational capital was contributed by private entrepreneurs 
(Doanh 1996: 66; CIEM 1999: 46). These corporations were fashioned 
after the South Korean Chaebol (OECD 2013) and chaired by a party 
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member. Arguably, the entrepreneurial path of the CPV’s adaption to 
market conditions has increased the party’s capacity for the inclusion and 
co-optation of new economic forces in the reform era, thereby contrib-
uting to the formation of a mutually transformative relationship between 
entrepreneurs and the party. Furthermore, by appointing party members 
to oversee those corporations that would implement Western-style liber-
alism and pursue capitalism, the CPV sought “to increase its compatibil-
ity” and build up its image as “the party of the whole nation, represent-
ing the most advanced production force” (H
i 2014: 144). At the same 
time, it could still control these liberal forces, even while noting that the 
alternative Stalinist economic policy of central planning had led the 
country to extreme poverty and the brink of political crisis in the 1980s.  
The fight against corruption, which is “only committed by party 
members,” is an on-going effort by the CPV to achieve a two-fold goal. 
The first objective is to clean itself, as the party admits that corruption 
threatens its survival and the regime. The second is to ease the public 
outrage when the CPV secretary-general bitterly acknowledged that “cor-
ruption is everywhere” and is like “itchy scabies.” Although the anti-
corruption campaign has achieved little and has more often been criti-
cised as CPV rhetoric (H
i 2012, 2016c), the party has at least successful-
ly calmed down the public anger by showing its determination to combat 
corruption. 
The CPV’s political flexibility in “everyday politics” is demonstrated 
in the ways it has responded to public outrage. In 2012, oàn Vn Vn, 
a shrimp farmer in the Tiên Lãng district of H
i Phòng, a northern sea-
port city 120 kilometres south of Hanoi, and his brother used homemade 
landmines and an improvised shotgun to engage security forces who 
came to evict him and re-possess his farmland (Quân 2012; VnExpress 
2012; ô and Th 2012; BBC 2013). The eviction was reportedly linked 
to corruption and land mismanagement by local authorities (Ponnudurai 
2012; D. Brown 2012; M. Brown 2012; ô and Th 2012b; GoVO 2012; 
TU-HP 2012). Public reaction to the case placed severe pressure on the 
CPV, leading the prime minister to declare that the eviction was “illegal.” 
A more recent case was a wild-cat protest by residents in Hanoi 
against a 6,700-tree-cutting campaign launched by the local government. 
The protest involved thousands of people and eventually caused the 
authorities to stop the campaign and discipline related officials. The 
chairperson of Hanoi municipal authority had to make an apology after-
ward. Although the case took place at the local level, it again showed 
how authorities have been flexibly responsive to public concerns and 
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have effectively managed civic outrage, which has been the source of 
political crises in many parts of the world. 
Repression of the Opposition 
A top Vietnamese leader recently instructed the regime’s security appa-
ratus not to tolerate political opposition forces and to be prepared to 
suppress any nascent opposition threat. Zachary Abuza (2015) pointed 
out five new tactics that the regime employed to suppress opposition and 
anti-government forces. These tactics are: targeting lawyers who repre-
sent political prisoners; using criminal charges to deflect criticism that 
those sentenced are political prisoners; tolerating physical attacks by 
non-uniform police and thugs against dissidents; recruiting an army of 
Internet polemicists to monitor and detect online anti-government activ-
ists, bloggers and Facebook users; and adopting coercive powers on 
websites that are trying to make the critical jump from individual blogs 
to multi-authored and edited news portals, a critical transition for the 
development of an independent media. More recently, the regime has 
used a tactic that can be termed as “political deportation”; that is, to 
“expel” and let its citizens–dissidents live in exile overseas. A number of 
well-known political dissidents, such as Trn Kh
i Thanh Thu, Cù Huy 
Hà V, iu Cày Nguyn Vn H
i, and most recently T Phong Tn, 
have been deported abroad for exile after being released from detention. 
This is not a new tactic that authoritarian rulers have used to isolate 
dissidents from the general populace. The case of well-known Soviet 
writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is a point of reference (Kaufman 2008). 
By using this tactic, the regime in Vietnam has smartly nullified the voice 
of these dissidents at home and prevented it from spreading in society.  
Expansion of International Relations 
Levitsky and Way (2010) theorised the post-Cold-War international di-
mension of democratisation, in which they focused on the so-called 
“Western leverage and linkages to the West.” Linkages to the West are 
identified by ties in the following six dimensions: (1) economic linkage, 
of flows of trade, investment, and credit; (2) intergovernmental linkage, 
including bilateral diplomatic and military ties as well as participation in 
Western-led alliances, treaties, and international organisations; (3) tech-
nocratic linkage, or the share of a country’s elite that is educated in the 
West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led 
multilateral institutions; (4) social linkage, or flows of people across bor-
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ders, including tourism, immigration and refugee flows, and diaspora 
networks; (5) information linkage, or flows of information across bor-
ders via telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western media 
penetration; and (6) civil society linkage, or local ties to Western-based 
NGOs, international religious and party organisations, and other trans-
national networks (Levitsky and Way 2010: 38–44). While the leverage 
may not be a direct regime threat, Levitsky and Way suggested that link-
ages are more effective in bringing down authoritarian regimes. However, 
the resilience of the CPV’s authoritarian regime informs those interested 
in the linkage theory that the theory does not yet apply in Vietnam. 
The CPV’s aim to amplify the regime’s linkage to the West is essen-
tially intended to boost the economy and protect it from exogenous 
pressures on political democratisation. Since i Mi, the regime has 
successfully expanded its international relations, transforming from being 
a member of the socialist camp to a member of the international com-
munity (Thayer 2015). Its linkages to the West have been deepened by 
joining the World Trade Organisation (1997), a Western-rule based trade 
organisation, and entering trade agreements with the European Union 
(2015) and the United States (2000) and, more recently, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (2016). The regime’s diplomatic relationships with Western 
nations have been intensified and characterised by different tiers, from 
normal to comprehensive and strategic partnerships. The nation’s linkag-
es to the West is also illustrated by the presence of hundreds of interna-
tional non-governmental organisations, most of which are based in 
Western countries and operating therein (PACCOM 2007). Altogether, if 
the six dimensions of linkage to the West suggested by Levitsky and Way 
holds true, Vietnam would have been transformed to democracy. Never-
theless, despite its deep and extensive linkage to the West, there is little 
sign that such a transformation will occur any time soon.  
Vietnam’s increasingly improved bilateral relationship with the 
United States, for example, is enabling the CPV to consolidate its legiti-
macy rather than posing a threat to the regime. In a state-to-state docu-
ment, the United States has committed to respecting Vietnam’s current 
political system (US–VN 2015), thereby implicitly recognising the CPV’s 
legitimacy in ruling the country. This commitment was echoed in the US 
President Barack Obama’s speech in Hanoi during his visit to the coun-
try in May 2016 (Obama 2016) despite there being serious concerns 
about the regime’s human rights violations records. By contrast, the 
United States has not done this with China, its most important trading 
partner, or with any other communist party-ruled regimes. There are 
assumptions related to Vietnam’s geo-political position that ferment the 
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closeness between the two former enemies. However, Vietnam also has 
established strategic partnerships with other Western nations, such as the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. Whatever hypotheses there may 
be about the regime’s international relations, its deepened linkages to the 
West thus far have proved to be the leverage to buttress its ability to 
withstand exogenous challenges to the regime’s resilience. 
Conclusion 
At the start of this article, I argued that the CPV’s authoritarian regime 
has been resilient since i Mi because it has been able to restore and 
maintain public trust, constrain the opposition at home, and reduce ex-
ternal pressures. I have illustrated this argument by analysing four elec-
tive sources: economic performance, political flexibility, repression of the 
opposition, and expansion of international relations.  
High economic performance is deemed as the principal source of 
the CPV’s legitimacy in the post-i Mi era, given that traditional legit-
imisation grounds are fading. The CPV has acknowledged that, thanks to 
economic liberalisation, public trust in the regime has been restored. In 
the political domain, the CPV has experimented and adopted changes to 
adapt itself to market conditions. More importantly, as the ruling party, 
the CPV’s changes have exerted an impact on the regime’s management 
of crises. Politically speaking, the CPV’s authoritarian regime embraces 
several features that could arguably explain its resilience to crises. It bears 
characteristics of David Shambaugh’s smart authoritarianism (2008), 
where the ruling party is responsive to public demands and creates 
mechanisms that aim to absorb and manage civic outrage. The adoption 
of grassroots democracy is an example of how the CPV uses a state-
controlled institution to manage political crisis. It also holds characteris-
tics of Levitsky and Way’s competitive authoritarianism (2002, 2013) 
where competitive spaces are somehow permitted and democracy is 
implemented even within the ruling party. Developments in elite politics 
before and during the CPV’s 12th congress, and the self-nomination 
movements in the national elections in 2016, offer vital illustrations for 
this characteristic (H
i 2016b). Finally, the CPV’s regime cannot yet be 
described as fully authoritarian, as perceived by Levitsky and Way (2010) 
and Snyder (2006), where political opposition is not entirely tolerated. 
The present article has also shown that the regime’s linkage to the West 
is not posing a threat to its durability, but instead helps intensify the 
regime’s legitimacy.  
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i Mi has proved the CPV’s ability to be resilient to shocks and 
periods of crisis as they unfold. However, the regime’s resilience is now 
being contested by new challenges associated with the so-called ‘the 
system’s fault’. These include high levels of public expenditure that has 
caused massive pressure on the state budget, a soaring sovereign debt, 
rampant corruption in the public sector, and destruction of the natural 
environment as a result of development. In addition, recent develop-
ments in elite politics, which are manipulated by vested interests and 
emerging crony capitalism in a more mature market economy, and the 
emergence of an increasingly assertive civil society with the support of 
the Internet, have presented tough challenges to the CPV’s rule. With 
regard to the effect of international relations, the CPV’s legitimacy is 
now threatened by its linkage to China rather than its close relationship 
with the West. China’s sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and 
its aggressive actions against Vietnamese fishermen have led the CPV to 
be cautious with the public if the regime wishes to establish closer ties 
with its ideological ally. In short, the resilience of the CPV’s authoritarian 
regime in the coming years will be contested by how smartly it deals with 
these challenges related to public trust in the regime. 
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